Women continue to be underrepresented in corporate leadership positions. This paper studies the role of social connections in women’s career advancement. We investigate whether access to a larger share of female peers in business school affects the gender gap in senior managerial positions. Merging administrative data from a top-10 U.S. business school with public LinkedIn profiles, we first document that female MBAs are 24% less likely than male MBAs to enter senior management within 15 years of graduation. Next, we use the exogenous assignment of students into sections to show that a larger proportion of female MBA section peers increases the likelihood of entering senior management for women but not for men. This effect is driven by female-friendly firms, such as those with more generous maternity leave policies and greater work schedule flexibility. A larger proportion of female MBA peers induces women to transition to these firms where they attain senior management roles. A survey of female MBA alumnae reveals three key mechanisms: (i) information sharing, especially related to gender-specific advice, (ii) higher ambitions and self-confidence, and (iii) increasing support from male MBA peers. These findings highlight the role of social connections in reducing the gender gap in senior management positions.

We revisit the role of temporary layoffs in the business cycle. While some have emphasized a stabilizing effect due to recall hiring, we quantify from the data an important countercyclical destabilizing effect due to “loss-of-recall,” whereby workers in temporary-layoff unemployment lose their job permanently. We develop a quantitative model allowing for endogenous flows of workers across employment and both temporary-layoff and jobless unemployment. The model captures both pre- and post-pandemic unemployment dynamics, including the contractionary role of loss-of-recall. We use our structural model to show that the Paycheck Protection Program generated sizable employment gains, in part by significantly reducing loss-of-recall. (JEL E24, E32, I12, J41, J63, J64)

Equal pay laws increasingly require that workers with different group identities doing “similar” work are paid equal wages within firm. We study such “equal pay for similar work” (EPSW) policies theoretically and test our models’ predictions empirically using evidence from a 2009 gender-based Chilean EPSW. Under EPSW, firms segregate their workforce by gender. When there are more men than women in a labor market, EPSW increases the gender wage gap. (JEL J16, J31, J38, K31, O15)

We propose a novel identification strategy to isolate exogenous immigration shocks across US counties, by interacting quasi-random variations in the composition of ancestry across counties with the contemporaneous inflow of migrants from different countries. We show a positive causal impact of immigration on local innovation and wages at the five-year horizon. The positive dynamic impact of immigration on innovation and wages dominates the short-run negative impact of increased labor supply. A structural estimation of a model of endogenous growth and migrations suggests the increased immigration to the United States since 1965 may have increased innovation and wages by 5 percent. (JEL J15, J22, J31, J61, O31, R11, R23)

We consider an economy in which long-lived experts are matched with short-lived clients. Experts choose the type of client with whom they match, unobserved by the market. The interaction outcome depends on both the expert’s and the client’s type. We study the effects of supplying information about otherwise unobservable outcomes, such as “medical report cards,” to help clients identify better experts. Such information can lead to inefficient matches, as experts reject risky clients to build their reputation. Hence, information can reduce welfare. Withholding information can mitigate these perverse incentives at the cost of misallocating experts known to be inept. (JEL C78, D82, D83)

Over 2 billion people lack clean drinking water. Existing solutions face high costs (piped water) or low demand (point-of-use chlorine). Using a 60,000 household cluster-randomized experiment, we test an alternative approach: decentralized treatment and home delivery of clean water to the rural poor. At low prices, take-up exceeds 90 percent, sustained throughout the experiment. High prices reduce take-up but are privately profitable. We experimentally recover revealed-preference measures of valuation. Willingness-to-pay is several times higher than prior indirect estimates; willingness-to-accept is larger and exceeds marginal cost. Self-reported health measures improve accordingly. On a cost-per-DALY basis, free water delivery regimes appear highly cost effective. (JEL I12, O12, O13, O18, Q25, Q51, Q53)

We propose an extensive-form solution concept, with players who neglect information from hypothetical events but make inferences from observed events. Our concept modifies cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin 2005) and allows that players can be cursed about endogenous information. (JEL C73, D44, D71, D81, D83, D91)

We investigate the origins and implications of zero-sum thinking: the belief that gains for one individual or group tend to come at the cost of others. Using a new survey of 20,400 US residents, we measure zero-sum thinking, political preferences, policy views, and a rich array of ancestral information spanning four generations. We find that a more zero-sum mindset is strongly associated with more support for government redistribution, race- and gender-based affirmative action, and more restrictive immigration policies. Zero-sum thinking can be traced back to the experiences of both the individual and their ancestors, encompassing factors such as the degree of intergenerational upward mobility they experienced, whether they immigrated to the United States or lived in a location with more immigrants, and whether they were enslaved or lived in a location with more enslavement. (JEL C83, D72, D91, H23, J15, J16, Z13)

Each month, a fraction of UK property leases are extended by 90 years or more. We construct a new dataset using thousands of these natural experiments since 2000 and estimate the expected long-term housing yield, y * . After remaining steady at around 5 percent, y * starts to decline when the Great Recession hits and reaches a low of 2.7 percent in 2024. The decline is steeper in inelastic markets, while y * remains higher in regions more exposed to long-run climate risk. Our estimate of y * is updated in real time using public data. (JEL E32, G12, Q54, R31, R38)

We assemble a new dataset spanning 150 years and 60 countries to study the economic toll of war. A war of average intensity is associated with an output drop of close to 10 percent in the war-site economy, while consumer prices rise by approximately 20 percent. The capital stock, total factor productivity, and equity returns all decline sharply. The economic ramifications of war are not confined to the war site. The evidence points to adverse economic outcomes in other belligerent and third-party countries if they are exposed to the war site through trade linkages or share a common border. (JEL D74, E23, E32, F43, F51, N40)

Why is workplace sexual harassment chronically underreported? We hypothesize that employers coerce victims into silence through the threat of a retaliatory firing. To test this, we estimate how two external shocks that reduce workers’ outside options—unemployment rate increases and sharp cuts to unemployment insurance benefits—affect the selectivity of sexual harassment charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. We find that both shocks increase selectivity, which implies an increase in underreporting. Bolstering these findings, anonymous Google searches for “sexual harassment in the workplace” (total prevalence) spike relative to charges filed (reported prevalence) during the Great Recession. (JEL J71, J78)

We derive asymptotically optimal statistical decision rules for discrete choice problems when payoffs depend on a partially-identified parameter θ and the decision maker can use a point-identified parameter μ to deduce restrictions on θ. Examples include treatment choice under partial identification and pricing with rich unobserved heterogeneity. Our notion of optimality combines a minimax approach to handle the ambiguity from partial identification of θ given μ with an average risk minimization approach for μ. We show how to implement optimal decision rules using the bootstrap and (quasi-)Bayesian methods in both parametric and semiparametric settings. We provide detailed applications to treatment choice and optimal pricing. Our asymptotic approach is well suited for realistic empirical settings in which the derivation of finite-sample optimal rules is intractable.

Time-inconsistency may play a central role in explaining inter-temporal behavior, particularly among poor households. However, little is known about the distribution of time-inconsistent agents, and time-preference parameters are typically not identified in standard dynamic choice models. We formulate a dynamic discrete choice model in an unobservedly heterogeneous population of possibly time-inconsistent agents. We provide conditions under which all population type probabilities and preferences for both time-consistent and sophisticated agents are point-identified and sharp set-identification results for naïve and partially sophisticated agents. Estimating the model using data from a health intervention providing insecticide treated nets (ITNs) in rural Odisha, India, we find that about two-thirds of our sample comprises time-inconsistent agents and that both sophisticated and naïve agents are considerably present-biased. Counterfactuals show that the under-investment in ITNs attributable to present-bias leads to substantial costs that are about four times the price of an ITN.

While the USD dominates cross-border transactions today, a few other currencies are also used internationally. This paper shows that central bank policies that reduce the volatility of borrowing costs for foreign firms in domestic currency can trigger a jumpstart of the currency’s international status, because firms’ choices of the currency of their working capital complement their sales invoicing. Empirically, the creation of swap lines by the People’s Bank of China between 2009 and 2018 supports this theoretical claim. Signing a swap line with a country is associated with an increase in the probability that the country would use the RMB at all by 12%, and a four-fold increase in the value of the country’s RMB payments.

Dynamic contracting plays a central role in many environments—for instance, in the sale of goods and services to consumers whose preferences evolve through learning, experimentation, or habit formation; in the taxation of workers whose productivity changes with learning-by-doing; in the provision of services on platforms with stochastic entry and exit of buyers and sellers; and in the matching of agents whose values and attractiveness are gradually revealed through past interactions. This article surveys several strands of the recent dynamic mechanism design literature, distills a few lessons, and points to promising directions for future research.

This article outlines an economic model that provides a framework for organizing the growing literature on the performance of physicians and judges. The primary task of these professionals is to make decisions based on the information provided by their clients. The article discusses professional decisions in terms of what Kahneman (2011) calls fast and slow decisions, known as System 1 and System 2 in cognitive science. Slow decisions correspond to the economist's model of rational choice, while System 1 (fast) decisions are high-speed, intuitive choices guided by training and human capital. This distinction is used to provide a model of decision-making under uncertainty based on Bewley’s (2011) theory of Knightian uncertainty to show that human values are an essential input to optimal choice. This, in turn, provides conditions under which artificial intelligence (AI) tools can assist professional decision-making, while pointing to cases in which such tools need to explicitly incorporate human values in order to make better decisions.

The effect of financial crises on bank branch location choices provides an unexplored channel by which crises affect access to credit for many years. We estimate a dynamic structural model of oligopolistic location choice for Thai banks allowing for competitive effects between rival banks. We predict the evolution of branch locations under the counterfactual scenario of no financial crisis in 1997. We find that there would have been 7.2% more branches and 4.8% more markets with at least one branch after ten years in the absence of the crisis. Furthermore, access to loans would have increased by 7.4 percentage points.

We model conflict as a prisoner’s dilemma between two groups represented by leaders: two group leaders who share group preferences and a common leader concerned with overall welfare. Leaders make recommendations and promises, and face penalties for unfulfilled commitments. A common leader who can be punished adequately and moves last induces cooperation. When the common leader does not move last, cooperation can still emerge with high probability provided the group leaders face large penalties for broken promises. The model highlights accountability and timing as key mechanisms sustaining cooperation between groups.