The study of nonelite women's political participation has received renewed focus, especially in the Global South. A focus on nonelite women reveals distinct models and understandings of the gendered constraints to political participation and power. Yet a lack of clarity in the conceptualization of nonelite women and their distinctions from elite women inhibits our understanding of the causes and consequences of women's political inclusion and its subsequent implications for democratic accountability and resilience. This article provides a conceptual framework for understanding nonelite women, their distinct political preferences from elite women, and their available political strategies. We review the literature on the constraints to nonelite women's political participation, highlighting the roles of resources, political institutions, and patriarchal social norms. We conclude by theorizing how patriarchal norms and their global variants shape the political behavior and strategies of nonelite women and their implications for the sustenance of political gender gaps.

This review examines the persistence and strengthening of Indigenous communities, identities, and nations in Latin America over the past two decades. Indigenous peoples in the region have transitioned from social movements to wielding actual political power, reshaping national politics, governance structures, and development paradigms. We analyze the evolution of scholarly literature beyond earlier biases in country selection and insufficient attention to racial and gender dimensions, highlighting communitarian feminist perspectives that link body, territory, and collective governance. The review addresses fundamental questions of Indigenous identity formation, linguistic revitalization, and the endogeneity of census categorizations. We examine territorial defense against extractivism, digital colonialism, and threats to data sovereignty, while also exploring traditional governance institutions, legal pluralism, and autonomy claims. Indigenous perspectives challenge conventional political science approaches through holistic worldviews that integrate spiritual, social, and environmental dimensions. Critical emerging issues include historical trauma's impact on political behavior, Indigenous health inequalities (particularly in mental health), and urban Indigenous youth participation. We argue that political science can gain much from recognizing Indigenous epistemologies, learning from Indigenous peoples’ experiences in their transformative processes for reimagining governance, collective action, and political engagement.

Ethnicity is an important cleavage in Africa, yet its influence on voting is contested. Selection biases from restricted choice sets complicate micro-level analyses, while ecological inferences and unobserved confounders hamper meso and macro-level approaches. Our new Covoting Regression (CVR) tackles several of these challenges. It estimates the effect of coethnicity on the probability that pairs of voters covote for the same party while conditioning on other shared characteristics. Thereby, CVR mirrors the micro-foundations of aggregate indicators such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index. We analyze Afrobarometer surveys from 28 countries and estimate that coethnicity increases covoting intentions between respondents by 17 percentage points. Politically relevant groups and covoting for ethnic parties drive this estimate, which is consistent across institutionally diverse countries and at least four times larger than that of other cleavages. The CVR addresses key issues in studying electoral consequences of socio-economic cleavages and bridges gaps between levels of analysis.

Poor public service provision creates an electoral vulnerability for incumbent politicians. Under what conditions can bureaucrats exploit this to avoid reforms they dislike? We develop a model of electoral politics in which a politician must decide whether to enact a reform of uncertain value, and a voter evaluates the incumbent’s reform based on post-reform government service quality, which anti-reform bureaucrats can undermine. Bureaucratic resistance for political leverage is most likely to occur when voters are torn between the reform and the status quo. Resistance lowers the informational value of government service for voters and can lead to policy distortions and accountability loss. When reform is moderately popular, resistance leads to policy inefficiency by preventing beneficial reforms due to electoral risks and inducing ineffective reforms by offering bureaucrats as scapegoats. Our model identifies a distinct mechanism of bureaucratic power and its implications for policy and accountability.

We helped design and evaluate a statebuilding intervention in Medellín, Colombia. The municipal government dramatically intensified nonpolice state presence in 40 neighborhoods over 20 months. On average, perceptions of security and legitimacy changed negligibly, suggesting that returns to statebuilding investments are generally low, at least within electoral cycles. Prespecified heterogeneity analysis, however, reveals significant increases in security and legitimacy where state governance began relatively higher, while impacts were null or possibly negative where it began lower. This suggests increasing rather than diminishing returns to statebuilding. The divergence apparently resulted from city officials under-delivering in initially lower-governance sectors. One reason might be “start-up costs” in statebuilding. Alternatively, both initial state penetration and incentives to implement new programs might depend on neighborhoods’ ability to hold agencies accountable. Whatever their source, increasing returns could drive persistent “neglect traps”—channeling political attention and investment to areas where state penetration is already robust, reinforcing existing disparities.

The credibility revolution advances the use of research designs that permit the identification and estimation of causal effects. However, understanding which mechanisms produce measured causal effects remains a challenge. The dominant current approach to the quantitative evaluation of mechanisms relies on the detection of heterogeneous treatment effects (HTEs) with respect to pretreatment covariates. This article develops a framework to understand when the existence of such HTEs can support inferences about the activation of a mechanism. We show first that this design cannot provide evidence of mechanism activation without additional, generally implicit, exclusion assumptions. Further, even when these assumptions are satisfied, the presence of HTEs supports the inference that the mechanism is active but the absence of HTEs is generally uninformative about mechanism activation. We provide novel guidance for interpretation and research design in light of these findings.

We analyze the effects of veto players when the set of available policies is not exogenously fixed, but rather determined by policy developers who work to craft new high‐quality proposals. If veto players are moderate, there is active competition between developers on both sides of the ideological spectrum. However, more extreme veto players induce asymmetric activity, as one side disengages from development. With highly extreme veto players, policy development ceases, and gridlock results. We also analyze effects on centrists' utility. Moderate veto players dampen productive policy development, and extreme ones eliminate it entirely, either of which is bad for centrists. But some effects are surprisingly positive; somewhat extreme veto players can induce policy developers who dislike the status quo to craft moderate, high‐quality proposals. Our model accounts for changing patterns of policymaking in the U.S. Senate and suggests that if polarization continues centrists will become increasingly inclined to eliminate the filibuster.

It has long been argued that paying politicians higher salaries should help decrease corruption. However, the empirical evidence is mixed, partly due to the large variation in contexts, research designs, conceptual definitions and measures of corruption, and the predominance of case studies with potentially limited generalizability. To alleviate these challenges, we evaluate uniformly defined and validated corruption risk indicators from an original dataset of more than 2.4 million government contracts in eleven EU countries, covering more than half of the European Union population and gross domestic product. To aid causal identification, we exploit sizable changes in salaries of local politicians tied to population size across close to 100 discrete salary thresholds. Applying fixed effects estimators, regression discontinuity, and difference-in-discontinuities designs, we consistently find that better-paid local politicians (by about 15 per cent on average) oversee less risky procurement contracts, by a third to one standard deviation on our measure of corruption risk.

How does technological change affect social policy preferences? We advance this lively debate by focusing on the role of dual vocational education and training (VET). Existing literature would lead us to expect that dual VET increases demand for compensatory social policy and magnifies the effect of automation risk on such demands. In contrast, we contend that dual VET weakens demand for compensatory social policy through three non-mutually exclusive mechanisms that we refer to as (i) material self-interest; (ii) workplace socialization; and (iii) skill certification. We further hypothesize that dual VET mitigates the association between automation risk and social policy preferences. Analyzing cross-national individual data from the European Social Survey and national-level data on education systems, we find strong evidence for our argument. The paper advances the debate on social policy preferences in the age of automation and sheds new light on the relationship between skill formation and social policy preferences.

This research note investigates how the involvement of firms in American politics has developed over the past two decades. The central question is whether individual firms have become more active lobbyists compared to business associations in the US Congress over this period. Different subdisciplines in political science have various expectations regarding the evolution of firm lobbying. We test which perspective is most accurate. To evaluate the hypotheses, we use a novel dataset comprising approximately 180,000 instances of lobbying activity by different types of interest organizations across a wide range of sectors and issues. In our analyses, we trace both the relative activity of firms versus business associations and their centrality in lobbying networks. While most theoretical models in the literature suggest a rise of firm lobbying activity, our results highlight a strikingly stable pattern of firm lobbying activity and centrality within the US political system over the past two decades.

Elected governments across the globe increasingly limit fundamental rights, arguably to manage societal divisions or counter serious harms, such as extremism and political violence. Yet which speech restrictions and group bans qualify as illiberal restrictions adopted by intrusive states, and which constitute safeguards in liberal societies endangered by extremism, remain open questions. This uncertainty hinders normative and empirical assessments of whether the changes in democratic legal architectures that we have observed in the United States, Europe, and Latin America signal democratic erosion or resilience. Integrating research from comparative politics, political theory, and law, we distinguish between a defensive and an illiberal logic of rights restructuring and, relatedly, propose conceptual tools to specify whether actual legal provisions limiting rights meet or violate liberal democratic minimum standards. To examine theoretically expected trends in rights restructuring, we employ these tools to analyze changes in the regulation of association, assembly, and expression in 12 European countries over a 23-year period. Worryingly, provisions falling outside the boundaries of self-defense—indicating an illiberal logic of rights restructuring—have grown. This substantiates concerns about democratic erosion, reinforced by a growing number of elected governments pushing, if not overstepping, legal limits to implement their political agendas.

In response to growing policy challenges, such as postconflict transitions and climate change, exceeding the scope of existing institutions, governments often enact extraordinary reforms—that is, nonincremental institutional innovations regulating state action through fast-tracking procedures, expanded mandates, and normative recalibration in previously unregulated domains. How do governments resolve policy conflicts when extraordinary reform collides with entrenched rules and interests embedded in previous institutional frameworks? We develop a theory of discretionary implementation, showing how governments use layering and conversion to diminish extraordinary reform. We examine Colombia’s ethnic land restitution program (2012–18), which clashed with extractivism, by employing process tracing of novel datasets on administrative cases and judicial rulings, and 14 in-depth interviews. We find that the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos delayed case processing via layering and restricted judicial discretion through conversion, effectively undermining restitution. Our findings extend theories of institutional change by revealing how governments mediate, and sometimes undermine, extraordinary reforms.

Has international human rights law become a tool reserved for the global elite? While some argue that human rights frameworks empower advocacy groups to pressure governments, others claim these institutions are accessible only to well-funded, transnational nongovernmental organizations and risk depoliticizing activists’ demands. Based on a study of the blacklisted workers’ movement in the United Kingdom, this study shows a new way in which human rights laws and institutions can catalyze social movements. Recognizing the limitations of human rights, activists take an instrumental approach that creates a duality in their movement. On-stage before public audiences, they leverage human rights to amplify grievances and push for reform. However, off-stage, human rights norms do not shape their ideological commitments or solidarity, which remain rooted in class-based identities. These findings demonstrate how human rights law can spur grassroots mobilization while decoupling the material and cultural drivers of social movements.

How does industrial decline influence politics? I propose three mechanisms linking industrial decline to voting. First, if unemployment soars as a consequence of a plant closure, this will result in local communities being economically deprived, which leads to lower support for the incumbent. Second, blame attribution should also play an important role since incumbents can be blamed for their handling of plant closures. Third, I argue that if people are compensated, this anti-incumbent effect should be reduced. I leverage the case of the closing of Lindø Steel Shipyard in Denmark to test in a quasi-experimental setting how a plant closure is linked to voting. Leveraging a difference-in-differences (DiD) design with national election data at the municipality level from 2001–2019, I first find that the closing of the shipyard reduced votes for the right-wing incumbent government. Second, I find that the closures increased unemployment in the short to medium term, and unemployment is negatively correlated with votes for the incumbent. Third, relying on survey data and interview data, I showcase that the government was blamed for its handling of the closure and the EU was credited for its support. Fourth, leveraging an event study design, I find that the political effects are not persistent. In the election, after receiving the compensation, the effects become insignificant, which at least suggests that the compensation could have been effective.

The ongoing revolution in the field of genome editing (GE) has ignited intense debate around new genomic techniques (NGTs) in Europe. Their societal and ecological implications underscore their critical importance. However, the development and implementation of NGTs present significant challenges from a democratic perspective. Amid calls for democratizing NGTs governance, democratic innovations have been proposed as potential solutions. This paper investigates the efficacy of democratic innovations in democratizing NGT governance within the European context. Employing an assemblage democracy approach, we conduct an in-depth analysis of online documents and activities related to two important public engagement processes addressing NGTs in France and the United Kingdom. Our findings reveal context-specific challenges in each country and propose potential remedies to enhance democratization efforts. This research contributes to the ongoing debate on science governance and participatory democracy in Europe, offering insights for scholars engaged in the intersection of emerging technologies and democratic processes.

Why do we see such strong backlashes against carbon taxes in rural areas? In this article, we focus on the role of perceptions in rural communities that the government unfairly advantages the urban centres of political and economic power. We argue that when people living in rural areas perceive of unequal treatment by the state, they are less supportive of carbon taxes, because they believe that carbon taxes unfairly punish those that have already been disadvantaged by the state. We carry out a survey with a representative sample of around 3000 respondents from the United Kingdom to test our argument. We provide observational and experimental evidence showing that for those living in rural areas, increased perceptions of unequal treatment by the state reduce the perceived fairness of carbon taxes and substantially lower support for carbon taxation. Our results suggest that tackling deep-rooted resentments around unequal treatment in rural areas is crucial for building broad public support for carbon taxation.

In contrast to the ‘benign’ and ‘hostile’ forms of secularism found globally, many European states exhibit a distinctive model we term ‘discriminatory secularism’. In this arrangement, the state discriminates against certain minority religions while privileging religious majorities, creating an uneven religious playing field. Discriminatory secularism is justified not on the basis of religious ideology but on the basis of secularist principles. We argue that discriminatory secularism fosters a culture of hostility toward minority faith communities, increasing the likelihood of physical violence against them. Using cross-national data from European states between 2003 and 2017, we find that higher levels of discriminatory secularism are strongly associated with greater violence against religious minorities. These results remain robust across multiple model specifications and statistical techniques.

This paper critically examines the concept of populism, challenging the predominant ideological definition by highlighting the importance of political relations between populist actors and elites. It argues that populism should be conceptualized as a political phenomenon characterized by conflict with dominant elites, rather than solely as a set of ideas centered on ‘the people’ and ‘elites’. Through a comparative analysis of four politicians – Tony Blair, Emmanuel Macron, Jeremy Corbyn, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon – the study demonstrates that although some actors utilize populist rhetoric, their tendency to generate conflict with elites distinguishes populist actors from other uses of populist ideas. The cases empirically demonstrate that ‘softer’ cases of populism indeed do not contain conflict and, thus, according to my approach, are not really populist. Thus, I demonstrate the inclination of ideational definitions to overstretch the concept of populism.

It is often argued that deliberation could improve citizens’ acceptance of the outcomes of direct democratic decision-making. However, the available scientific evidence remains limited and it remains unclear to which degree these findings can be generalized and reflect causal effects. We therefore use a randomized survey experiment on a large-scale representative sample of the Dutch population to disentangle the impact of direct democratic processes in the form of referendums in isolation compared to situations where deliberation is added, and wherein the outcome of this deliberation is either (a) congruent or (b) not congruent with the referendum outcome. We find a positive significant effect among our respondents when there is congruence between the deliberative mini-public and the referendum outcome and a negative significant effect when there is incongruence. Both effects seem to cancel each other out: overall we find no clear evidence in favor of an average positive or negative impact of deliberation added to a referendum. In an explorative analysis we find some evidence suggesting that outcome acceptance of incongruent processes is lower the less respondents deem the procedure fair (moderator effect). Lastly, while not designed as direct replication, our study provides some evidence in line with a prior seminal study by Germann et al. (Political Studies 72(2), 677–700, 2024) regarding higher outcome acceptance, specifically among decision losers, when deliberation is added to referenda, although only when the outcomes of deliberation and the referendum are congruent.

Is mental health an emerging political identity? In the first study that investigates experiencing mental illness as a political identity, I find that it is. Using a nationally representative survey of Americans fielded in the 2022 CES (N = 1,000), I answer the question: “ For whom is mental illness a political identity?” I adapt Jardina’s work (White Identity Politics. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108645157 .) to create mental health identity and mental health alienation batteries that examine closeness with the ingroup, importance of identification to self, strength of identification within the ingroup, and alienation. I find that people who have experienced mental illness feel close to others who have experienced mental illness. They are also likely to self-categorize as having or having had a mental illness, share a sense of group consciousness with others who have or had mental illness, and recognize the need to work together to change laws that are unfair to people with mental illness. I further find that there is an emerging mental health political identity that is most pronounced among younger (Gen Z) and more liberal Americans. I also find that the emerging mental health identity has political predictors and political consequences. Those who self-categorize and have high scores on the mental health identity and/or alienation scales are just as likely to participate politically and use (social) media, on average, as those who do not self-categorize and have low scores on the mental health identity and/or alienation scales. In addition, there is a strong association between mental health categorization, identification, and alienation and the expressed desire for increased healthcare, education, and welfare spending. Finally, I find that the political predictors and political consequences for the emerging mental health identity differ from those for physical disability and serious physical illness categorization and identification. These findings have far-reaching consequences for mental health advocacy and the role mental health identity will play in the political sphere—especially as Gen Z matures as a cohort.

While citizens are sufficiently informed about parties’ ideological stances during elections, we know little about how the perceptual accuracy of party positions evolves beyond the election campaign period. We argue that, during election campaigns, when political information is more readily available, citizens perceive party positions more accurately, but this perceptual accuracy decreases outside of election time. Leveraging the as-if random variation in interview timing in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems dataset across 21 established democracies and the panel data structure of the British Election Study Internet Panel, we show that perceptual accuracy declines post-election and increases during the pre-electoral campaign period. Additional analyses suggest that these fluctuations in accuracy are primarily due to individuals becoming less informed rather than updating their perceptions in response to new information. These findings have important implications for democratic representation.

Recent global crises have renewed interest in the rally-’round-the-flag phenomenon of public opinion. At the same time, many studies have focused on deepening political polarization across countries. This study synthesizes these two lines of research by exploring how public opinion in a deeply polarized society responds to a security crisis that, in a less polarized context, would likely have led most citizens to close ranks behind a government that declared war on national enemies. We analyzed original panel data collected in Israel before and after the October 7 Hamas attack and during the subsequent Israeli military operation in Gaza. The findings reveal a split pattern: while the vast majority of Jewish Israelis supported the war and trusted the security forces, trust in the government and prime minister remained low. The analysis further identifies two distinct sets of mechanisms of attitude. Support for the war and trust in the security forces were associated with threat perceptions and anger about the enemy’s actions. In contrast, trust or mistrust in the government and prime minister hinged on whether respondents attributed blame for the crisis to the government or to the oppositional protest movement, an assessment tied to their preexisting views on the government’s controversial “judicial reform” initiative. These results suggest that extreme political polarization can prevent the emergence of a unified rally behind governments during severe security crises, mainly when internal strife produces contested views about the government’s responsibility for the crisis.

Undocumented immigrants contribute to the US economy by participating in the labor force, paying taxes, and starting businesses. They do so under constant fear of deportation and while being barred from government assistance programs. Nevertheless, misconceptions about how they affect the job market and public finance persist, exacerbating animus and hindering policy reforms. Across three survey experiments and three national samples of Americans, I assess two informational interventions to increase positivity toward this group: facts, which tackle misinformation, and narratives, which foster empathy. Both interventions yield positive results overall, with anecdotal accounts of “hardworking” undocumented immigrants proving most effective among those most negatively predisposed against them. The persuasive success of economic considerations in this domain has concrete implications for policymakers and advocates in their efforts to rally public support for immigration reform and against mass deportations. Further, these findings complicate motivated reasoning accounts and suggest that belief updating is possible, provided information is tailored to the intended audience.

Belief homophily—the tendency to associate with others who hold similar beliefs and the distaste for different beliefs—is often seen as a major cause for belief‐based social segregation and polarization. We question, however, whether social scientists have been correct in identifying belief‐homophily as the primary force driving these pernicious social effects. We argue that when people face others who hold beliefs different from their own, they find these encounters disturbing, primarily when they are convinced that others' beliefs are false . In four pre‐registered online studies ( N = 2027 U.S. adults) featuring self‐recalled experiences and vignette scenarios, we find that participants express stronger negative feelings when others hold false beliefs, compared to when others' beliefs are merely different from their own. We also document that higher confidence that others hold false beliefs evokes more negative emotions, triggers stronger avoidance behaviors, and reduces people's desire to form any kind of relationship with others. These findings highlight the possibility that many of the effects that have been previously attributed to belief homophily may be better explained by the desire to avoid others holding false beliefs.

At the heart of liberalism lie two seemingly conflicting ideals: a commitment to robust individual rights and an ideal of equal opportunity. The former offers rights‐holders discretion in terms of with whom to cooperate, who to hire, admit, and so forth. The latter is often understood to require policies of affirmative action. This conflict is visible in the recent US Supreme Court Decision Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard University , which firmly decided the matter on behalf of liberal rights. However, such a resolution shifts the burden of injustice on those who are negatively affected by it. And this seems unfair. At the same time, affirmative action threatens to shift these burdens entirely to employers and other applicants. And liberal rights are meant to protect us from being made to bear such burdens. This essay offers a solution to this problem by formulating a rights‐based defense of affirmative action policies. According to this argument, affirmative action policies are fair when they realign the actual (injustice‐tainted) distribution of opportunities with the distribution to which people are entitled as a matter of their social positions. This solution is fair since rights‐holders have no just claims against lacking opportunities they had no right to enjoy in the first place, and victims of injustice have no more claim to redress than what their rights were supposed to yield. The argument justifies significant policies of affirmative action with respect to hiring, admissions, and so forth, in ways that remain fully consistent with even the strongest form of liberal rights.

Surveys frequently report widespread belief in conspiracy theories, prompting concerns about their democratic consequences. Yet, standard survey measures often implicitly treat agreement as equivalent to politically consequential belief, even though agreement can reflect a range of engagement—from momentary reactions to durable worldviews. This paper argues that an important dimension of belief is often insufficiently captured in existing approaches: salience. I introduce a salience-based measure that incorporates certainty and prior familiarity to distinguish more tentative or situational endorsement from internalized, action-relevant belief. Using original survey data, I show that this measure correlates more strongly with psychological traits associated with conspiracism and better predicts self-reported engagement: including discussing, posting about, and researching conspiracy theories. These results suggest that traditional measures may overstate the prevalence of politically meaningful conspiratorial belief and obscure substantial heterogeneity among those who agree with conspiracy claims. By refining how belief is measured, this paper offers a tool to more accurately identify which survey endorsements are likely to reflect consequential belief.

How do political scandals in neighboring regions affect people’s evaluations of their own government? By investigating the spillover effects of corruption investigations on public political trust in China, this article finds that scandals in neighboring areas can trigger a contrast effect among the public. Corruption investigations in nearby regions positively influence people’s trust in their local government, suggesting that evaluations of an institution are shaped not only by the institution itself but also by the performance of comparable entities.

Previous research has shown that the perception of party positions changes when they are in government. To what extent does this also apply to populist radical parties? Including radical actors in a coalition gives some legitimization to their views and normalizes them; therefore, they might be perceived as ideologically more moderate. However, the reactions to government inclusion might be different for supporters of populist radical parties compared to other voters. Hence, this paper aims to examine if populist radical parties that are included in a government coalition are perceived as ideologically more moderate and whether partisanship moderates this effect. A time-series cross-sectional analysis of the public perception of governing populist radical parties in 29 elections across 20 European countries shows that they are not always seen as more moderate when in office. This paper contributes to the study of coalition heuristics and populists in power and has important consequences for our understanding of party mainstreaming.

Vaccine hesitant sentiments are reported among some ethnic and racial minority communities. This study argues that their vaccine hesitancy stems from distrust in the government that marginalizes them. Building on existing studies on ethnicity, health, and political trust, this study offers an original contribution by using causal mediation analyses to provide suggestive evidence of a mediating relationship between ethnic marginalization and vaccination intention and by focusing on African countries. We conduct causal mediation analyses of nationally representative survey data across 14 African countries and find that trust in government mediates the effect of perceived ethnic marginalization on COVID-19 vaccination intention. Perceived marginalization decreases government trust and thus reduces vaccination intention. The findings have implications beyond the pandemic era. A path dependent consequence of marginalization during non-crisis times hinders collective actions during crisis times. Governments must put efforts into combating ethnic marginalization during non-crisis times.

As many representative democracies face growing challenges of public dissatisfaction and legitimacy crises, understanding how to enhance citizens’ support for political decision-making processes becomes increasingly crucial. While existing research suggests that public participation can strengthen democratic legitimacy in well-established Western democracies, relatively little attention has been paid to whether the positive effects of public participation also hold in young democracies like South Korea. Moreover, many studies on the effect of public participation do not assume that its effects should be varied across different segments of the population. Through a survey experiment with 2083 adults in South Korea, we examine how participatory processes enhance citizens’ legitimacy beliefs at the local level. We find that a decision-making process including public participation produces a higher legitimacy belief than decision-making process without public participation. We also find that the effect of a participatory policy-making process on legitimacy beliefs is higher among citizens with a stronger anti-elite attitude. Our study not only extends previous research beyond Western democracies but also reveals how public participation might serve as a crucial tool for rebuilding democratic legitimacy among disaffected citizens, particularly in young democracies where citizen engagement remains underdeveloped.

This article is a review of the recent literature on generational differences in electoral behaviour. We first discuss several conceptual issues, after which we provide a description of the main findings in three fields: the role of generations in (1) turnout, (2) party choice and (3) the determinants of party choice. In the concluding section we discuss a number of overall patterns that emerge from this very rich literature. We also sketch some pitfalls and avenues for further research.

Choosing coalition partners is not only about size but also revolves around policy. Although this claim is undisputed at the national and regional levels, the role of ideology in local coalition formation remains contested. This study examines how policy positions and issue salience influence coalition formation after two consecutive elections in 30 municipalities in the Belgian region of Flanders. We apply for the first time the concept of preference tangentiality – the degree to which parties prioritize different policy areas – to the analysis of coalitions at the local level. Our findings reveal that ideological proximity increases parties’ likelihood of forming coalitions, but only to the extent that they do not cooperate with the far-right Vlaams Belang. While preference tangentiality alone does not predict local coalition formation, it becomes important for ideologically coherent executives in which parties must differentiate themselves from their coalition partners. These findings enhance our understanding of policy-related factors in coalition formation at the local level.

The United States Special Envoy for the Human Rights of LGBTQI+ Persons was established by presidential mandate and sat in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the U.S. Department of State. The position was established in 2015 when John Kerry served as the U.S. Secretary of State during the second Barack Obama administration. It did not exist during the first Donald Trump administration. Special Envoy Jessica Stern (JS) became the second person to hold this position when she was appointed by President Joe Biden in 2021. The post has not existed since January 2025. This is a slightly edited version of an interview that took place with Mona Lena Krook (MLK) via Zoom on January 5, 2026.

The United States Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues led the Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues at the U.S. Department of State. The position was created in 2009 when Hillary Clinton served as U.S. Secretary of State during the administration of Barack Obama. Ambassador Geeta Rao Gupta (GRG) was the fourth Ambassador-at-Large and the first woman of color to hold the position. In 2025, the Ambassadorship and Secretary’s Office of Global Women’s Issues were eliminated by the Donald Trump administration. This is a slightly edited version of an interview that took place with Mona Lena Krook (MLK) via Zoom on February 4, 2026.

This study examines the inclusion-moderation thesis within the context of Israeli populism, focusing on how government participation influences the communication styles of populist legislators. By analyzing a comprehensive dataset of tweets from Israeli lawmakers between 2015 and 2022, we explore whether holding office leads to a moderation of populist rhetoric. Our findings indicate that while coalition members generally exhibit reduced populist communication, this moderation varies significantly between ministers and backbenchers. Most importantly, in populist radical-right parties (PRRPs) backbench coalition legislators do not moderate: they maintain a populist communication style akin to their opposition counterparts. This research contributes to the understanding of populism in a non-European context and highlights the complexities of integrating radical parties into democratic governance, suggesting that moderation is not uniformly achieved across party lines.

Are Afrodescendant candidates more likely than white candidates to retire following electoral defeat? Numerous studies examine the emergence and electoral success of racial minority candidates, but we know remarkably little about how they respond to electoral defeat. There is reason to suspect that defeated racial minority candidates are less likely than defeated white candidates to run again because they are treated differently by political elites and members of the public. Using data from Brazilian elections and a regression discontinuity design, however, we present compelling evidence that Afro-Brazilian candidates who barely lose are just as likely as defeated white candidates to compete in subsequent elections. These findings challenge assumptions about racial disparities in political resilience and the prospects for closing Brazil’s racial representation gaps.

The fact that Toward Perpetual Peace is presented as a satirical peace treaty is a detail that has been largely overlooked in the literature. This article argues that when one reads Toward Perpetual Peace with its formal presentation in mind, what emerges is a work of philosophical literature that acts politically through its rhetorical form. The article shows how Kant—through what is here called his rhetoric of hope—offers a political education to two kinds of readers: the many, who are susceptible to a “despotic” moralism, and the elite, who embrace the principles of a selfish despotism. The main elements of this education are Kant’s teaching on republicanism, as the only regime both prudent and morally legitimate, and his account of “Nature’s Guarantee” of human progress, which seeks to reorient how readers experience the apparent disagreement between morality and politics. The article then examines a third audience: philosophers who “dream that sweet dream” of perpetual peace. Kant teaches philosophers how to intervene in political life through philosophical uses of rhetorical modes of speech—such as irony, satire, and regulative narratives—designed to reorient the moral judgment of these different audiences.

Measuring the value of cabinet portfolios is a fundamental task in the study of coalition politics. Yet existing measures are often static, have limited coverage, or assume that all parties value portfolios equally. In this paper, we introduce a new approach that overcomes these problems. We argue that parties signal their portfolio preferences through legislative behaviors, such as floor speeches, bill sponsorship, motions, and budgetary earmarks. Leveraging these behaviors as inputs, we develop and validate a dynamic Bayesian latent‐variable model to disentangle two concepts: a portfolio's underlying salience and the specific value each party assigns to it, independent of the effects of office‐holding. Applying this method to Brazil, a presidential system in which government coalitions and cabinet changes are frequent, we show that our estimates capture portfolio importance and their temporal shifts better than alternative measures. Furthermore, we show that portfolio allocation among coalition parties is more proportional once we weight portfolios using our salience scores. We provide a checklist and a replication repository applied to Denmark for researchers interested in adapting our framework to other contexts.

The ability to discuss politics intelligently with others is a central activity in many undergraduate political science courses, often forming a key part of student assessments and contributing significantly to the development of civic competence. This study explores the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) as a tool to facilitate deliberative discussions among students. Based on our research, we present evidence that student interactions with an AI for political discourse can yield benefits that are similar to human-to-human political deliberation—including an increased openness to sharing views, discovery of common ground, and incremental improvement in respect for differing political views. These findings suggest that AI may offer a promising, scalable, and accessible solution to enhance deliberative learning experiences while potentially overcoming barriers observed in traditional classroom settings.

Using a citation network approach, this study investigates how the subfield of African politics has evolved since its emergence in the late 1950s by focusing on the influence of African and Africa-based scholars in the top 20 political science journals. We find that African and Africa-based authors are systematically underrepresented in our sample and among the most influential authors today. Starting from a low base, African and Africa-based scholars experienced a period of increasing influence between 2000 and 2010; however, their influence has declined substantially since then. This article highlights two key factors associated with this decline: (1) the rising competitiveness of top-tier political science journals, which increasingly are privileging particular quantitative methodologies that require substantial financial resources and training; and (2) the increasing citation rates of non-African and non-Africa-based scholars in leading political science journals. The article concludes with recommendations that promote greater inclusivity and pluralism, with broader implications for the political science discipline.

Appeals to national security play a central role in contemporary US trade politics. Who drives this security narrative and why? We argue that executive branch actors, regardless of political party affiliation, are more likely to frame trade policy in national-security terms. In Congress, however, we expect Republicans to rely more heavily than Democrats on a national-security narrative. We tested these expectations through a systematic analysis of trade-related discourse by congressional and executive actors from 2001 to early 2025. Using a large language model to examine a substantial corpus of speeches, press releases, and official statements, we find only partial support for our argument: the anticipated partisan difference appears, but security framing is more prevalent in Congress than in the executive branch. Overall, the evidence suggests that actors use security framing as a strategic tool to reinforce their role and confer legitimacy on particular trade policies.